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Introduction	
The	general	ward	delivers	the	majority	of	acute	inpatient	care	in	health	systems	worldwide.	This	
ward	care	accrues	significant	costs:	approximately	£5	billion	[$7.3	billion]	per	year	in	the	NHS,	a	
quarter	of	NHS	inpatient	expenditure.1	Defining	and	improving	the	performance	of	medical	wards	is	
an	international	priority,2,3	not	only	because	of	the	scale	of	the	care	they	deliver,	but	because	their	
stock	in	trade	–	dealing	with	complex,	increasingly	frail	patients	–	is	a	standard	bearer	for	the	
challenges	facing	health	systems	more	broadly.4	Yet	major	gaps	in	our	understanding	of	ward-level	
performance	remain.5-7	
	
Safety	and	quality	interventions	have	been	most	effective	in	improving	relatively	standardised	
clinical	tasks	and	processes.		Medical	ward	care,	however,	is	likely	to	require	a	more	varied	suite	of	
interventions.	Important	differences	between	medical	wards	and	other	clinical	settings	have	not	
been	clearly	articulated;	measures	of	organisational	performance	typically	ignore	variation	between	
wards;	and	influential	quality	metrics	do	not	align	well	with	multimorbidity.	We	explore	each	of	
these	issues	in	turn,	and	set	out	an	alternative	vision	for	ward	improvement,	one	that	embraces	–	
rather	than	ignores	–	the	complexity	of	ward	care.	
	
The	medical	ward	is	a	different	animal	
Medical	ward	teams	care	for	a	particularly	heterogeneous	group	of	patients:	there	is	no	single	best	
pathway	for	this	cohort’s	diagnosis	or	treatment.	These	teams	confront	a	steady	diet	of	variety	and	
uncertainty.	This	sets	them	apart	from	other	hospital	clinical	microsystems,	which	typically	manage	
more	narrowly	defined	patient	populations,	with	more	predictable	care	trajectories.	With	such	
heterogeneity,	medical	ward	teams	rely	heavily	on	their	interpersonal	networks	and	information	
flow,	more	than	any	unifying	clinical	or	business	aim.	
	
Making	these	interdisciplinary	networks	‘work’	is	a	major	challenge.	Episodes	of	ward	care	are	long,	
involve	multiple	teams	and	frequent	handovers,	and	lack	a	central	procedure	around	which	a	
structured	care	narrative	can	be	formed.	Even	within	a	single	shift,	interdisciplinary	teams	are	large	
and	fluid,	and	geographically	dispersed	throughout	the	hospital.	While	nurses	may	spend	their	shifts	
on	a	given	ward,	it	is	rare	for	all	physicians	and	allied	health	professionals	to	be	physically	located	on	
one	unit	(cohorted)	with	their	patients.	 	
	
Errors	in	this	setting	are	common	and	often	serious:	medical	ward	patients	have	the	same	risks	of	
preventable	and	fatal	adverse	events	as	those	in	intensive	care.7,8	Preventable	hospital	deaths	are	
disproportionately	caused	by	failures	in	general	ward	care;6	crucially,	those	failures	are	different	to	
the	climactic,	procedural	misadventures	of	the	operating	theatre	or	intensive	care	unit.8	Instead,	
ward	harm	occurs	as	the	result	of	accumulated	omissions	–	repeatedly	missed	opportunities	to	
provide	needed	care.6,9	
	
Even	with	this	risk	profile,	wards	struggle	to	attract	the	resources	they	need	to	improve.10	
Organisational	attention	is	more	readily	drawn	to	the	operating	theatre,	intensive	care	unit,	and	
specialty	services,	which	have	the	advantages	of	higher	status	and	a	more	concentrated	focus.10,11	
Responsibility	for	ward	harms	is	spread	more	diffusely,	deterring	action,	and	the	sheer	variety	of	
possible	improvement	targets	on	medical	wards	may	be	overwhelming.7	Senior	decision-makers	may	
also	be	less	motivated	to	combat	wards’	errors	of	omission,	which	are	judged	more	leniently	than	
equally	harmful	errors	of	action.12,13	
	
Facing	different	clinical	challenges,	producing	different	harms,	and	receiving	less	organisational	
support,	medical	ward	care	may	be	10-100	times	more	hazardous	than	elective	surgery	or	low-risk	
anaesthesia,	crossing	a	perceived	threshold	into	‘unsafe’	care.14	Improvement	strategies	devised	for	
these	more	structured	environments	undergo	little	further	testing	on	medical	wards,15	even	though	
their	implementation	faces	different	challenges	(Table	1).		The	ward	environment	may	require	a	very	
different	combination	of	safeguards	and	tools	to	reliably	deliver	high	quality	care.
Table	1:	Implementation	challenges	when	safety	strategies	are	adapted	for	medical	wards	
Safety	strategy	/	
target	
Factors	underpinning	success	in	highly	
structured	clinical	settings	
Challenges	for	medical	ward	
adaptation	
Safety	checklists	 Adaptation	for	a	specific	patient	group	or	
workflow	
Heterogeneity	of	patients	
Consistent	leadership	and	accountability16	 Fluid	team	membership	and	
geographical	dispersion	
	
Division	of	responsibility	between	
multiple	teams	
Specific	harm	
reduction	
programmes	
Strong	evidence	base	for	technical	
interventions	to	reduce	hospital-acquired	
harms	(e.g.	CLABSIs)	
Weaker	evidence	base	for	technical	
interventions	to	reduce	common	
ward	harms,	like	pressure	ulcers	and	
falls17,18	
Implementation	efforts	address	a	limited	set	of	
products	and	critical	events,	occurring	primarily	
in	closely	monitored	settings19	
Successful	implementation	requires	
constant	vigilance	throughout	long	
admissions,	with	collaboration	
between	teams	
	 Alignment	of	clinical	priorities,	national	patient	
safety	initiatives	and	regulators’/payers’	
influence	
Frontline	perspectives	on	ward	care	
are	not	prioritised	in	national	
initiatives20	
Outcomes	
monitoring	and	
feedback	
Defined	surgical	outcomes	directly	reflect	
quality	of	inpatient	care21,22	
Many	outcomes	for	medical	patients	
are	determined	by	socioeconomic	
status	and	illness	severity,	and	are	
less	representative	of	quality	of	care	
	 Single	climactic	episode	of	care,	on	which	
performance	is	reliably	assessed	
Diffuse	episodes	of	care,	with	shared	
responsibility;	multiple	opportunities	
to	judge	performance	
Abbreviation:	CLABSI	–	central	line-associated	bloodstream	infection
	Important	variations	in	ward	care	are	hidden	within	organisational	grades	and	scores	
Despite	the	key	distinctions	between	medical	wards	and	other	clinical	microsystems,	most	
healthcare	quality	measures	evaluate	entire	hospitals,	not	individual	units.	This	hinders	
improvement	on	any	unit,	but	particularly	affects	medical	wards,	which	are	less	often	seen	as	
coherent	microsystems	in	need	of	targeted	support.	Yet	lay	assessors	and	researchers	both	agree	
there	is	more	variation	within	hospitals	than	between	them.	Public	inquiries	find	islands	of	
excellence	alongside	areas	with	egregious	deficiencies,	within	a	single	institution.23,24	Assessing	
multiple	units	in	over	500	hospitals,	Pronovost	and	Sexton	also	cautioned	against	a	unified	view	of	
hospital	practice.25	
	
Ward-level	variation	outweighs	hospital-level	variation	in	areas	ranging	from	adverse	event	rates,	to	
safety	and	teamwork	climates,	to	job	satisfaction	and	perceptions	of	management.26-28	If	anything,	
improvement	efforts	have	accentuated	this	trend.28	Data	analysis	should	target	the	ward	level	more	
intensively.26,27	A	better	understanding	of	variations	in	ward	care	would	allow	for	the	selection	and	
tailoring	of	appropriate	improvement	interventions.	The	interventions	themselves	also	typically	rely	
on	ward-level	data	monitoring	for	successful	implementation.29	
	
In	practice,	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	governments,	regulators	and	consumer	organisations	
prioritise	hospital-wide	grades	and	hospital-aggregated	data.30,31	The	more	granular	variations	of	
ward	performance	are	overlooked,	producing	blanket	hospital	grades	that	are	inconsistent,32	and	
aggregated	hospital	outcomes	that	are	not	accurate	indicators	of	quality	of	care.31,33-40	Importantly,	
these	aggregate	measures	obscure	the	need	for	greater	investment	in	detailed	ward-level	datasets.	
Without	them,	major	policy	decisions	–	on	the	adequacy	of	resources	for	safe	staffing,	for	example	–	
will	be	based	on	incorrect	inferences	drawn	from	averaged,	hospital-level	data.41	
	
Quality	metrics	for	medical	wards	can	embrace	complexity	of	care,	or	ignore	it	
Medical	ward	patients	primarily	come	to	harm	through	suboptimal	clinical	monitoring,	diagnostic	
errors,	and	inadequate	drug	or	fluid	management.6	These	themes	reiterate	the	fundamental	
challenges	of	ward	care,	which	is	a	dynamic,	evolving,	team	process	of	assessment	and	
reassessment,	rather	than	any	single	static	decision.	Quality	metrics	would	ideally	reflect	this	
complexity,	but	more	commonly	impose	a	more	reductive	concept	of	care,	where	evidence-based	
treatments	are	either	delivered	or	not.	
	
	In	the	United	States,	the	quality	of	medical	inpatient	care	is	represented	by	a	limited	set	of	common,	
well-protocolised	‘tracer’	conditions:	myocardial	infarction,	pneumonia,	congestive	heart	failure,	
chronic	obstructive	pulmonary	disease,	stroke	and	venous	thromboembolism.42	These	conditions	
have	a	significant	disease	burden:	treating	them	in	a	timely	and	effective	fashion	is	an	
understandable	concern.	However,	their	prioritisation	–	with	a	national	mandate	to	publicly	report	
relevant	process	measures	and	outcomes	–	may	be	ineffective,43,44	and	comes	with	opportunity	
costs.	Disease-specific	quality	metrics	do	little	to	incentivise	robust	systems	of	care	that	protect	
complex	medical	patients	from	harm.45	Rather,	their	high	profile	selection	implies	that	high	quality	
care	in	this	setting	is	best	achieved	by	focusing	on	individual	pathologies,	one	at	a	time.	
	
The	NHS	is	taking	a	different	approach.	Whilst	quality	guidance	for	disease	management	is	still	
developed	by	the	National	Institute	for	Health	and	Care	Excellence,	NHS	England	recently	issued	an	
updated	set	of	10	overarching	clinical	standards	for	acute	care.46	These	standards	set	out	a	different	
stall,	requiring	(amongst	other	things)	shared	decision	making;	early	multi-disciplinary	assessment;	
multi-professional	handovers;	repeated	senior	review;	and	attention	to	patient	experience,	safety	
and	clinical	effectiveness.	This	is	a	very	different	set	of	aspirations,	better	aligned	with	the	needs	of	a	
complex	patient	population,	yet	still	backed	by	a	series	of	levers	and	incentives.47	
	
The	future	ward:	four	strategies	to	manage	complexity	
Having	argued	for	resources,	data	collection	and	quality	metrics	that	acknowledge	the	complexity	of	
medical	inpatient	care,	what	can	feasibly	be	done	at	ward	level?	We	envisage	four	broad	categories	
of	ward	intervention	to	help	address	complexity.	The	first	two	of	these	seek	to	reduce	unnecessary	
variation,	standardising	and	simplifying	how	predictable	challenges	are	handled.	The	latter	two	
make	better	use	of	existing	resources	to	optimise	how	complex	care	is	managed	(Figure	1).	
	
1. Standardise	predictable	care	tasks	to	reduce	specific	harms	
Interventions	to	improve	the	delivery	of	disease-specific	care,	and	reduce	specific	harms,	do	still	
have	a	place.	They	standardise	common,	predictable	care	tasks,	reducing	unwarranted	variation	in	
care	–	both	by	establishing	clear	technical	standards,	and	introducing	the	socioadaptive	changes	
necessary	to	embed	them.29	However,	staff	may	fatigue	in	the	face	of	an	endless	number	of	single-
issue,	best-practice	campaigns.	Each	new	initiative	risks	diluting	attention	to	existing	
commitments,48	and	adds	to	the	growing	burden	of	costly	performance	data	reporting.49,50	
Standardisation	efforts	should	be	selected	strategically,	mindful	of	the	organisation’s	capacity	to	
implement	them.51	
		
2. Simplify	the	care	environment	and	the	systems	that	support	care	delivery	
The	environment	of	ward	care	is	rarely	a	focus	for	national	initiatives.20	Excess	noise,	poorly	
designed	supply	chains,	convoluted	communication	pathways,	and	inaccessible	information	force	
frontline	staff	to	develop	arduous	workarounds.	These	complicate	predictable	tasks,	and	reduce	the	
time	available	for	direct	clinical	care.52,53	
	
Interventions	to	improve	the	clinical	environment	and	its	support	structures	can	reduce	these	
unnecessary	burdens	–	and	are	likely	to	be	cost-effective.54	Current	intervention	targets	include	
standardised	alarm	parameters	for	devices;	electronic	communication	channels	between	ward	
teams	and	the	specialists	who	provide	them	with	intermittent	advice;	accessible	decision	support	
incorporating	multimorbidity-appropriate	guidance;	and	internal	supply	chains.	Together,	these	
would	reduce	unwarranted	sensory	inputs	and	information	overload,	streamline	information	
exchange,	reliably	deliver	useful	clinical	prompts,	and	increase	time	spent	with	patients.		
	
3. Optimise	interdisciplinary	team	effectiveness	
High	performing	teams	are	required	to	manage	complex	tasks,55	and	optimising	interdisciplinary	
team	effectiveness	first	requires	appropriate	team	structures.56,57	Many	ongoing	ward	initiatives	
share	common	structures:	unit-based	teams,	cohorted	with	their	patients;	physician	and	nurse	co-
leadership;	structured	interdisciplinary	rounds;	and	ward-level	performance	feedback.58-61	These	act	
as	useful	‘scaffolds’,	binding	physicians,	nurses	and	allied	health	professionals	together	with	
collective	accountability,	and	a	sense	of	belonging,	even	with	fluid	team	membership.62	Their	impact	
remains	uncertain,63-65	and	few	high	quality	studies	have	addressed	their	effects	on	adverse	events	
and	complications	of	care.63	Refining	these	interdisciplinary	team	care	structures	further,	to	improve	
patient	experience,	remains	a	key	challenge.58,66	Nonetheless,	some	authors	have	already	called	for	
them	to	be	incentivised,	seeing	them	as	vital	for	the	rapid	translation	of	evidence	into	ward	
practice.19	
	
4. Patient	engagement	in	transitions	of	care	
With	patients	infrequently	‘cured’	by	their	inpatient	care,	only	stabilised,	the	distinction	between	
hospital	and	home	care	has	become	more	fluid.	Transition	between	the	two	care	settings	involves	
complex	interactions	between	patients	and	multiple	healthcare	providers,	who	are	poorly	
coordinated.	Patients	struggle	to	understand	their	post-discharge	plan,	and	their	self-management	
at	home	is	poorly	supported.	As	a	result,	27%	of	medical	readmissions	are	still	preventable.67,68	
	
	Higher	quality,	patient-centred	discharge	documentation	would	help	patients’	self-management,	but	
more	expansive	care	delivery	changes	are	needed.69	Novel	care	models	will	integrate	inpatient	and	
outpatient	management	for	high-risk	patients,	reducing	care	discontinuity.70	Patients	might	be	best	
supported	by	(lay)	community	`health	agents’,	who	can	help	facilitate	the	move	from	one	care	
setting	to	the	next.71	The	effects	of	these	programmes	are	still	being	evaluated,	but	they	offer	an	
alternative	to	hospital-focused	readmission	prevention	schemes,	which	may	not	be	financially	
sustainable.72	
	
Conclusion	
High	quality	care	for	general	medical	inpatients	is	easy	to	value,	but	its	inherent	complexity	makes	it	
difficult	to	operationalise	and	improve.73	Targeted	resources,	data	collection,	quality	metrics	and	
ward	improvement	strategies	that	facilitate	the	management	of	complexity	may	hold	promise	for	
our	aging	inpatient	population.	Their	needs	are	anything	but	simple.	
	
Key	messages:	
- Medical	wards	face	a	specific	combination	of	challenges,	but	data	analysis	and	quality	
metrics	do	not	take	into	account	the	inherent	complexities	of	care	in	this	setting	
- Regulators	should	be	wary	of	organisational	grades	and	scores	that	mask	important	ward	
variation	
- Healthcare	leaders	should	endorse	quality	standards	that	promote	good	management	of	
complexity	
- Local	managers	should	explore	ward	improvement	strategies	that	focus	on	complex	
decision-making,	not	solely	on	the	management	of	specific	diseases	
- Unit-level	physician	&	nurse	co-leadership,	unit-based	teams,	structured	interdisciplinary	
rounds,	and	ward-level	performance	feedback	may	be	useful	structures	for	interdisciplinary	
team	improvement	
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Figure	1:	Categories	of	ward	intervention	to	manage	complex	medical	ward	care	
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